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Abstract
Two widely discussed pricing benchmarks in the literature on payment cards markets are the
"tourist test" interchange fee (Rochet and Tirole, 2010), which internalizes usage externalities
in payment card markets, and "perfect surcharging" by merchants (Rochet and Tirole, 2002).
This paper shows that these benchmarks are allocatively equivalent. Implications for the
regulatory treatment of interchange fees and no-surcharge rules are discussed.
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1 Introduction
Payment card associations like VISA and MasterCard have been the subject of antitrust investi-
gations around the world, including the U.S., the European Union and Australia. The focus of
these investigations has often been the interchange fee, a per-transaction transfer from acquiring
banks (who provide merchants with access to card networks) to issuing banks (who issue payment
cards to consumers). Interchange fees are either collectively set by the banks that participate in
a card payment network or by card payment associations themselves.
A large literature starting with Baxter (1983) has been assessing the welfare e¤ects of collec-
tively determined interchange fees, including Rochet and Tirole (2002, 2010), Wright (2003, 2004)
and Guthrie and Wright (2007). What this literature shows is that privately and socially optimal
interchange fees often diverge. These results are derived under the assumption that merchants
cannot surcharge more costly payment instruments, either because of transaction costs of price
di¤erentiation or because of a no-surcharge rule imposed by payment card associations.
Perfect surcharging of more costly payment instruments is an interesting benchmark, because
it would make two-sided payment card markets one-sided in the sense of Rochet and Tirole (2006).
Rochet and Tirole (2006) dene two-sided markets as markets where not only the price level but
also the price structure across the two sides of the market has allocative implications. As Rochet
and Tirole (2002) and Gans and King (2003) have shown, interchange fees (which determine
the price structure in payment card markets) become neutral if merchants surcharge more costly
payment instruments without frictions. In other words, perfect surcharging makes payment card
markets one-sided.
However, even for the most expensive payments cards, surcharging very rarely occurs in prac-
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tice although no-surcharge rules are prohibited by law in some countries.1 One reason for this may
be the existence of transaction costs of surcharging (Rochet and Tirole, 2003). Due to this market
imperfection, interchange fees have real allocative e¤ects even where no contractual restrictions
on surcharging are imposed. The absence of frictionless surcharging may therefore give rise both
to a need for an interchange fee to achieve the most e¢ cient market outcome and to a danger that
excessive interchange fees are set from the perspective of social welfare.
Based on previous results derived in the literature, Farrell (2006) has proposed what has later
been termed the "tourist test" (or "avoided cost test") as the appropriate benchmark for antitrust
assessment. This is the interchange level that renders merchants indi¤erent between di¤erent
means of payment. As Wright (2003) had shown earlier, the tourist test fee internalizes usage
externalities and (in the special case of perfectly competitive banks) maximizes social welfare.
Rochet and Tirole (2010) extend Wrights results by providing extensive welfare analysis for a
range of di¤erent scenarios.2 They show that in principle, a social planner could use the inter-
change fee not only to internalize usage externalities (as the tourist test does), but also to a¤ect
the relative exercise of market power on the two sides of the market. Rochet and Wright (2010),
however, advise against such targeted price regulation, not least because of the large informational
requirements it presupposes. Instead, as Farrell (2006), they propose use of the tourist test as
a conservative regulatory benchmark.3 Besides this attention the tourist test has received from
economic theory, it has also received signicant attention in banking and policy circles. Indeed,
in the follow-up of an antitrust procedure against MasterCards interchange fees, the company
recently proposed and implemented a cap on its European cross-border interchange fees which is
1See Bolt, Jonker and van Renselaar (2010) for recent empirical evidence on surcharging from the Netherlands.
2For instance, they show that in case the cost pass-through of issuers does not exceed the cost pass-through of
acquirers, increases of the interchange fee above the tourist test level reduce the total surplus of users.
3Note that Rochet and Wright (2010) dene the tourist test with respect to store credit rather than cash, because
they consider the former a more appropriate counterfactual for credit cards.
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based on the tourist test, to seek compliance with competition law.4
Building on the results in the previous literature, the purpose of this paper is to show the
following: the two benchmarks described above (the tourist test fee and perfect surcharging of
merchants) are allocatively equivalent. That is, the tourist test fee simulates as a second-best tool
the market outcome that would arise if no frictions existed that would obstruct merchants from
passing on correct price signals to their customers (given an arbitrary level of the interchange fee).
This equivalence result holds irrespective of the level of bank competition in the issuing market
and independent of the size of the corresponding issuing pass-through of the interchange fee to
cardholders.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 sets up the model, which follows the seminal
description of payment card markets by Rochet and Tirole (2002). Section 3 derives the result of
the equivalence of perfect surcharging and the tourist test fee. Section 4 discusses the result in
the context of previous assessments of surcharging. Section 5, nally, concludes.
2 The Model
Consumers. Consumers want to buy one unit of a homogeneous good either with cash or a
payment card. Given the cardholder fee f , demand for cards is given by D(f) with D0(f)  0.
Issuers. Issuing banks set the cardholder fee f . A card transactions generates a net cost
of cI   a for the issuing bank, where cI is the per-transaction cost of issuing and a denotes the
interchange fee, a transfer from the acquiring bank. Given this cost level, issuers compete in
prices, leading to some (symmetric) equilibrium cardholder fee f(cI   a) with f 0 > 0. As in
Rochet and Tirole (2002) we assume issuing prots to be decreasing in cost.
4See http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/09/143&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en
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Acquirers. Acquirers are assumed to be perfectly competitive. Thus, given per-transaction
costs cA, they set the merchant service charge (the price merchants pay to acquirers for executing
a transaction) at m = cA + a.
Merchants. There are two merchants, engaging in Hotelling competition. Consumers have
a su¢ ciently large willingness to pay for the good. They are located uniformly on a segment of
measure one and incur transportation costs of t per unit of distance. Merchants are located at
the two ends of the segment. Each merchant i = 1; 2 sets prices picash for cash payments and p
i
card
for card payments (which are constrained to be identical in case surcharging is not possible). As
Rochet and Tirole (2002), we will restrict attention to interior solutions of the merchant pricing
subgame. Both merchants have marginal costs of production d and enjoy a benet of b per card
transaction. Merchants can decide whether or not to accept cards.
Timing. The timing is as follows.
Stage 1: The interchange fee a is set by issuing banks or a social planner.
Stage 2: Issuers set cardholder fees f , consumers choose whether to purchase a card, merchants
decide whether to hold cards and then set retail prices p1cash, p
1
card, p
2
cash, and p
2
card.
Stage 3: Given retail prices and merchantscard acceptance decisions, consumers decide where
to buy the good and whether to use a card or cash.
Rochet and Tirole (2002) show that there is complementarity in merchantscard acceptance
decisions; either both merchants accept or both reject payment cards. If surcharging is not
possible, the (common) equilibrium price p in the merchant pricing game is characterized by
p = d+ t+D[f(cI   a)](cA + a  b). (1)
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This is the usual Hotelling price consisting of the sum of marginal costs and transportation costs.
Here, marginal costs are production costs d plus the expected costs of card payments, which
consist of the fraction of the population D() that holds cards and the net per-transaction cost
cA + a  b.
If surcharging is possible, on the other hand, merchants will ask for prices
pcash = d+ t (2)
and
pcard = d+ t+ cA + a  b. (3)
Again, these prices reect marginal cost plus transportation costs, given a consumers choice
of payment instrument.
3 Equivalence of surcharging and tourist test fee
Following Rochet and Tirole (2010), Wright (2003) and Farrell (2006), the tourist test fee is dened
as follows.
Denition 1 The tourist test fee aT = b   cA is the level of the interchange fee that makes
merchants indi¤erent between card and cash payments.
The following proposition demonstrates that any surcharging equilibrium with an arbitrary
interchange fee a0 is equivalent to the nosurcharging equilibrium where the interchange fee is
set at the tourist test level aT . This equivalence result holds irrespective of the level of bank
competition in the issuing market and independent of the size of the corresponding pass-through
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of the interchange fee to cardholders.
Proposition 1 Suppose there are no transaction costs associated with surcharging. Then, for an
arbitrary interchange fee a0, lifting the no-surcharge rule is equivalent to setting the interchange
fee at the tourist test level.
Proof. Denote the cardholder fee that banks charge if surcharging is possible by F (cI   a0).
We will rst compare two scenarios. Scenario 1 is the situation where surcharging is possible
and the interchange fee is set at the tourist test level aT = b   cA. Scenario 2 is the situation
where surcharging is not possible and the interchange fee is also set at the tourist test level. In
scenario 1, we have pcard = p

cash = d+ t from (2) and (3). There is price-coherence, because the
interchange fee is set such that merchants are indi¤erent among payment instruments. What is
more, the retail price in scenario 1 exactly matches the retail price in scenario 2, where p = d+ t
as cA+a  b = 0. Because there is e¤ectively no surcharging in scenario 1, it must be that issuing
banks set the cardholder fee in scenario 1 at the same level as in scenario 2, that is F (cI+cA b) =
f(cI + cA   b). In summary, all agents are una¤ected by a change from scenario 1 to scenario
2. But since Proposition 6 in Rochet and Tirole (2002) shows that the level of the interchange
fee is neutral if surcharging is possible, the surcharging equilibrium must always be equivalent to
scenario 2, not only if the interchange fee is set at the tourist test level. Hence, the proposition
follows. 
4 The welfare e¤ects of surcharging
Besides showing the equivalence of the tourist test fee and frictionless surcharging, this paper
allows assessing the welfare implications of surcharging in payment card markets. As Rochet and
Tirole (2002) have shown, surcharging may either increase or decrease social welfare compared to
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a situation where a no-surcharge rule is in place and the interchange fee is set by the payment card
association. The above result explains why this is the case and when one or the other outcome
will arise. Following Rochet and Tirole (2010) the privately optimal interchange fee aP is larger
than the tourist test fee aT . The socially optimal interchange fee aS is contained in the set that
is bounded by the tourist test fee and the privately optimal fee, that is aS 2 [aT ; aP ]. aS is
decreasing in the degree of competition in issuing, as a larger interchange fee acts as a subsidy to
counter the output restriction of cards that arises if issuing banks have market power (Vickers,
2005). If issuing competition is perfect, aS = aT . In that case, lifting the no surcharge rule must
increase welfare. On the other hand, if there is an issuing monopoly, aS may or may not reach aP
at the other extreme of the set, depending on the parameters. Hence, the surcharging equilibrium
will always improve welfare relative to the privately optimal fee without surcharging whenever
competition in issuing is su¢ ciently strong. If issuing competition is weak, on the other hand, the
surcharging equilibrium may or may not improve welfare with respect to the privately optimal fee
without surcharging, depending on whether the socially optimal fee is closer to the tourist test
fee, or whether it is closer to the privately optimal fee.
5 Conclusion
This paper has analyzed the relation between two interchange benchmarks, which are widely dis-
cussed both in academic research and regulatory practice: the tourist test and perfect surcharging.
It turns out that these benchmarks are allocatively equivalent. This has two implications. First,
the result shows that the tourist test mimics as a second-best mechanism the market outcome in
the absence of transaction costs that inhibit merchants from di¤erentiating retail prices by means
of payment. The tourist test therefore focuses on the market failure that is specic about pay-
ment cards markets (the lack of e¢ cient internalization of network externalities that is induced
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by frictions in surcharging), rather than additionally trying to steer bank market power through
the imperfect means of interchange regulation. Second, the result allows a more intuitive assess-
ment of the welfare e¤ects of lifting no-surcharge rules. Indeed, whenever the transaction costs of
surcharging are su¢ ciently small that surcharging is possible, the welfare implications of lifting
no-surcharge rules can be conveniently and directly inferred from the welfare implications of the
tourist test (e.g. along the lines of Rochet and Tirole, 2010).
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